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Abstract: 
‘Health and safety’ currently has an image problem in the UK. This article 
explores the origins of these current negative perceptions, framed around 
the concept of legitimacy – the degree to which a policy project of this sort 
is viewed as right, proper, and appropriate. The article considers and 
evaluates key moments in the growth and decline of social consensus 
around health and safety since 1960, including the Robens Committee and 
subsequent Health and Safety at Work etc Act, the decline of trade 
unionism, the extension of health and safety beyond the workplace, and the 
rise of the safety profession. It concludes that change has been much more 
subtle and less uniform than general perceptions might suggest, and makes 
recommendations for how public engagement with occupational health and 
safety might be restructured. 
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One of the most pressing concerns felt by many in the field of occupational 
health and safety recently has been the legitimacy, or the public profile and 
acceptance, of the regulatory system and of those who are active within it. 
Two recent, major, government-backed reviews of the health and safety 
regulatory system (Löfstedt 2011; Young 2010) highlighted the perceived 
problem of hostile and negative public perceptions in this area. Both 
reviews identified a widespread social climate of antipathy and mistrust 
towards the idea of health and safety and regulation within the UK. This 
concern led to the launch of a government-led public consultation on health 
and safety issues (the ‘Red Tape Challenge’ of 2011-13: 
http://www.redtapechallenge.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/about/), and to various 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE, the UK’s national health and safety 
regulator) initiatives to engage with negative coverage and stories about the 
‘problem’ of health and safety (including a ‘Mythbuster’ challenge panel: 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/myth/index.htm). The central issue these processes 
have been seeking to engage with is the narrative of ‘health and safety gone 
mad’ found in mainstream media coverage, in political debate, and in other 
manifestations of the ‘public consciousness’ (Almond 2009; 2015). The 
public profile of health and safety is thus perceived to be poorer now than it 




This suggests a need to consider whether a fundamental shift has taken 
place in the current state of affairs surrounding health and safety in the 
United Kingdom. Health and safety has long been a key feature of the 
modern welfare state and of contemporary industrial relations; it formed a 
central part of the protectionist and paternalist reform movement of the 19th 
Century that sought to address the social costs of the industrial revolution 
(Bartrip and Fenn 1983; Carson 1979; Long 2011; MacDonagh 1958; Mills 
2010; Thomas 1948; Ward 1962) and was also linked to both the post-war 
‘wave of humane feeling and high aspiration for the future’ (Mess 1926: 33) 
that followed World War 1, and to the pursuit of welfare-oriented social 
citizenship rights via the extension of the welfare state after World War 2 
(Tucker 1995). At each stage, so the narrative goes, improving health and 
safety became more established and embedded as a desirable part of modern 
life, and a consensus around the issue and the need for some degree of 
regulation and control emerged. This culminated in the Robens Report of 
1972, which identified a need for reform to modernise the regulatory system 
so as to better reflect the ‘natural identity of interest’ (Robens 1972: 21) 
between all parties involved in the area of health and safety, and the 
subsequent Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, which embedded a 




While this framework has endured, there are grounds for suspecting that the 
wider social consensus around the issue, and the political settlement that 
enacted it, may have shifted decisively in recent years. While the critical 
climate of recent years looks and feels like a significant disjuncture with the 
past, there are also grounds for seeing it as part of a more long-term shift, as 
a climate of neoliberal politics and ideological rejection of regulation and 
welfarism has become gradually more entrenched since the late 1970s 
(Harvey 2005; Tombs and Whyte 2010; Tucker 1995), and the mechanics of 
state-based regulation have shifted to reflect the terms of a ‘new public 
management’ centred on increasing  efficiency, Ministerial oversight, and 
regulatory accountability, and reducing material regulatory capacity 
(Baldwin and Cave 1999; Hood 1991). At the same time, it cannot 
necessarily be taken for granted that the degree of criticism that attaches to 
‘health and safety’ now is greater, or more fundamental, than that 
encountered in the past. There is a need, as a result, to assess both the 
direction and extent of change, and to identify whether the drivers of change 
might lie at the institutional and political levels, or more in the social and 
cultural context against which systems of health and safety regulation 
operate.  
 
The aim of this paper is to communicate a set of historically-grounded 
observations on contemporary trends in the public profile of health and 
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safety, and a series of lessons learned that may be of value to those who are 
concerned about these issues. Studying regulatory history is a fundamentally 
valuable means of better understanding the present, and learning for the 
future (Balleisen and Brake 2014; Berridge 2010; Cox 2013; History and 
Policy 2015). The first section of the paper will outline and review the 
concept of regulatory legitimacy, and the contested nature of health and 
safety, both now and in the recent past. In particular, the core issues of 
public acceptance and political priority will be explored. The second section 
will then seek to outline the core methodologies of the study, briefly 
highlighting the use of mixed methods and the scope of the inquiry. The 
third section will identify the most significant social and historical 
developments that have had a bearing on the way that health and safety is 
perceived by the public and is categorised and prioritised as a political issue. 
Particular attention will be paid to those issues that are directly relevant to 
the debates and areas of activity of safety professionals, representative 
bodies, and other actors in the field of health and safety practice. The final 
section will set out what implications this account of historical development 
has for the future of health and safety practice. It will make pragmatic 
suggestions as to the ways in which the public presentation of health and 





1) Health and safety and the struggle for legitimacy 
 
Legitimacy is a complex and multifaceted social science concept which 
reflects the value that is attached to a social institution by the different 
bodies and audiences that are subject to its decisions or that interact with it 
(Beetham 1991; Suchman 1995). It provides a conceptual basis for assessing 
the ‘social standing’ that an issue like health and safety might enjoy. Unlike 
many other studies of regulatory legitimacy (Black 2008; Murphy, Tyler, 
and Curtis 2009; Tyler 2011), this investigation has attempted to trace the 
standing of a nebulous idea (‘health and safety’) rather than a particular 
agency (such as HSE), and has looked at the judgements made by the 
various social audiences of that idea, not just those who are subject to 
regulation. Legitimacy is defined by Suchman as a ‘generalized perception 
or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions’ (1995: 574), and as taking three main forms: 
cognitive (it is believed to be inevitable or necessary), pragmatic (it is 
believed to be factually beneficial), and normative legitimacy. It is this latter 
form that encompasses the different value judgements that might be made 
about an idea or system of rules like ‘health and safety’. A key distinction 
can be discerned here between recognising the legality of a decision, i.e. it is 
arrived at properly, and the rightness of that decision, i.e. it is morally 
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justified (Beetham 1991). Black (2008) breaks these down into four areas of 
value judgement: constitutional claims (due process, valid authority, legal 
mandate); functional claims (efficiency, expertise, consistency); justice 
claims (rightness, fairness, social value); and democratic claims 
(participatory, open, reflects public preferences). Each matters, and each can 
be explored in turn. 
 
We can begin to trace the influence of debates around legitimacy when we 
sketch out some of the key features of recent debates and public 
controversies around the field of health and safety. Political leaders have 
increasingly attacked the issue of health and safety; in 2008, while in 
opposition, David Cameron stated that “...this whole health and safety, 
human rights act culture, has infected every part of our life”1 and by 2012, 
he was describing his “New Year’s resolution: to kill off the health and 
safety culture for good. I want 2012 to [be] the year we get a lot of this 
pointless time-wasting out of the British economy and British life once and 
for all".2 Health and safety has been subjected to repeated review and 
reform during the five years of coalition government since 2010 (Almond 
2015; James, Tombs, and Whyte 2013). The way that matters of ‘health and 
                                                          
1 Speech to Conservative Party Conference, reported in The Guardian, 01/10/2008; 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/oct/01/davidcameron.toryconference1) [Accessed 
05 May 2015]. 
2 ‘Coalition plans to kill off 'health and safety monster' with limits on lawyers' fees’, 
reported in The Telegraph, 05/01/2012 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/8995276/Coalition-plans-to-kill-off-health-and-
safety-monster-with-limits-on-lawyers-fees.html) [Accessed 05 May 2015]. 
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safety’ are reported in the popular media, particularly print newspapers, has 
also become increasingly hostile. The Löfstedt Review expressed concern 
about the effects of a ‘constant stream of stories in the press blaming health 
and safety...for preventing individuals from engaging in socially beneficial 
activity, overriding common sense and eroding personal responsibility’ 
(2011: 16). Cumulatively, these sources might indicate that the societal 
consensus about the progressive value of health and safety that underpinned 
the Robens report (1972) and the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 has 
been eroded or reversed. 
 
Additionally, a vocal anti-regulatory lobby has called for the removal of 
health and safety burdens via the consultation processes associated with 
these government reviews, and via a Government-backed ‘Business 
Taskforce’, which categorised the EU’s Health and Safety at Work 
Framework Directive as a ‘barrier to starting a company and employing 
people’ (Business Taskforce 2013: 22). While the Löfstedt Review, and 
subsequent Temple Review of HSE (Temple 2014), a triennial government 
review of HSE’s function, gave formal support to the existing health and 
safety regime, these processes of review provided a platform for debates 
about the fundamental value of state-led health and safety regulation, and 
about the proper balance between economic competitiveness and 
protectionist intervention. Indeed, historical analysis clearly identifies that 
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these debates, and others of a political or ideological nature, have always 
underpinned the area of health and safety protection to varying degrees 
(Almond and Esbester 2016; Bartrip and Fenn 1983; Carson 1979; Esbester, 
forthcoming; Long 2011; McIvor 2013; Thomas 1948; Ward 1962). Health 
and safety regulation is, and has always been, a political issue, and so it 
becomes important to ask whether this current period and climate represents 
something new, or reflects longer-term tensions in the regulatory state.  
 
Health and safety is contested on the basis of how it operates (functional), 
on what authority (constitutional), but also on the basis of why it operates 
(justice), and whose interests it represents (democratic). Crucially, it is not 
common for specific bases for these judgements to be spelt out in explicit 
terms. The study undertaken must identify and pull apart these differing 
currents of evaluation to analyse and make sense of them. At the same time, 
however, the society and phenomena being regulated have changed as well; 
British society, and the British workplace, are profoundly different now to 
how they were in 1960 or 1974. The structure of employment within Britain 
has changed, with shifts from manual, industrial jobs to office-based roles, 
greater proportions of women working, and greater prominence for working 
practices beyond a ‘standard’ working week based at one physical location 
(including more flexible arrangements, like part-time working or work from 
home). In addition, workplace technologies have changed dramatically, 
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along with new awareness of issues, both physical (such as musculoskeletal) 
and psychosocial (such as stress). These changes have posed significant 
challenges for regulators, duty-holders, and others.  
 
2) Scope and methodology of the current study 
 
The research project on which this paper is based utilised a mixed-
methodology approach to gather a rounded overview of the way that health 
and safety has been understood and evaluated by policymakers, the public, 
and society as a whole over the last 60 years. The project has endeavoured 
to synthesise the findings of all of these methodological components to 
produce a single, coherent, narrative of change over time. Firstly, in order to 
generate new insights into historical processes, and to gather evidence about 
the judgements and decisions made at different points in time, a series of 
interviews (n=40) with key stakeholders and historical actors was 
undertaken. The participants were recruited because of their range of 
experiences and prominence in key areas, and in order to ensure that a range 
of constituencies were represented (regulators, policymakers and politicians, 
trade union actors, safety professionals and representative bodies, and 
employer and business actors). Each interview adopted a semi-structured 
approach, with a series of questions around which the participant was 
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encouraged to direct and develop the discussion according to their own 
priorities and recollections. 
 
Secondly, as this is an historical study, it was necessary to engage with a 
wide range of qualitative historical, archival, and documentary sources. 
Although limited by the survival and preservation of documents as well as 
access restrictions on material under 30 years old, material consulted was 
produced by state bodies, trades unions, employers’ organisations, workers, 
the media and non-governmental organisations such as the British Safety 
Council and the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA). 
Records were selected by availability and a process of initial sampling to 
gain a broad overview, followed by more concentrated focus on areas 
identified in oral history interviews and focus groups as of particular 
importance. Thirdly, it was necessary to take account of current public 
attitudes, and so a two-pronged investigation was undertaken. Existing data 
sets and empirical studies have been systematically reviewed and analysed 
by a team based at Nottingham University (Jain and Leka 2015). To 
augment this quantitative data, a series of focus groups (n=8) were 
conducted with members of the public (n=67) to discuss perceptions and 
attitudes towards the idea of health and safety. These focus groups were 
conducted in different geographical locations across the country, with 
participants who were sampled to ensure broad demographic 
12 
 
representativeness. They were structured, in that a common outline for 
discussion was utilised in each, and were analysed via an open coding 
framework.  
 
3) Key issues and developments affecting legitimacy 
 
A wide range of social and historical developments have had a bearing on 
the way that health and safety is regarded; the parameters of the discussion 
here will set out the most significant issues and also those that a professional 
body like IOSH and its members can influence and address (such as the 
agency of individual actors, the framing of debates, and access to 
government), rather than those (like the decline of manufacturing, or wider 
social/demographic/economic shifts) that they cannot. These four main 
areas of coverage will be explained in turn, with their key features 
summarised as a means of showing the direction and scope of the wider 
project.  
 
A: Constitutional Challenges: The Status of Regulators and the Law 
 
Much of the existing literature on regulation and legitimacy suggests that it 
is vital to understand and take account of the formal, constitutional and legal 
bases on which power is exercised and decisions are made (Baldwin 1995; 
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Black 2005; Tyler 2011). The institutional mechanisms of regulation impact 
primarily upon the perceptions of those who are regulated (via, for example, 
the style and outcome of interactions with regulators); since this study is 
concerned with wider political and social legitimacy, it has focused on the 
components of constitutional structure that speak to the broader public and 
political constituencies of health and safety. 
 
A single, central, unified regulator? 
 
It might be suggested that while something was gained in amalgamating 
multiple inspectorates into a single body after the HSWA, in terms of 
procedural and organisational clarity and consistency, and direct 
accountability and oversight, something was also lost, in that the new body 
a) lost some of its traditional grounding and autonomous capacity (it became 
a little more distant from its regulated population); and b) it became a larger, 
more substantial, more wide-ranging organisation, with the associated 
pressures and scrutiny that that brought. In an effort to alleviate some of 
these pressures, HSE’s Chief Inspector of Factories, Jim Hammer, 
suggested in 1975 that the HSE’s strategy of political containment and 
consensus-building should be ‘defusing criticism before it came by 
“selling” the organisation to MPs in times when it was not under attack due 
to the occurrence of a particular incident’ (HSE Management Board 
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Minutes, 1975). No sooner had the first wave of organisational changes 
bedded in, than a second wave of changes had to be negotiated; following 
the Clapham rail crash and the Piper Alpha disaster, HM Railways 
Inspectorate and the responsibility for regulating and inspecting offshore 
installations were shifted into HSE (in 1990 and 1991), mainly as a means 
of addressing some perceived conflicts of interest that undermined the 
legitimacy of those bodies in their previous departmental locations 
(Department of Transport and Department of Energy). This was also a 
means of depoliticising some aspects of regulation in these areas, post-
disaster; arguably, this also had the effect of politicising some areas of 
HSE’s work. In recent years, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate and the 
Railway Inspectorate have shifted out of HSE once again; the interplay of 
commercial and protective pressures and responsibilities suggests that the 
regulation of safety in these areas is still subject to broader economic, 
political, and social pressures. As Hammer noted in interview: 
“It was after Piper Alpha and the Cullen Inquiry that the offshore 
inspectorate came into the HSE…that of course brings up the whole 
business of who do you use to inspect a very specialist industry? All 
mines inspectors had to have been mine managers…That’s very 
much poacher turned game keeper. It used to be similar for the 
railways. But the offshore inspectorate certainly depended on 
people's specialised knowledge just as we had our chemists and 
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engineers. But I think we did our best to, as it were, train them in a 
‘control mode’, to be independent. But of course they inspected their 
former colleagues and friends. It’s not easy.” (Jim Hammer 
interview, para.73) 
 
The most profound element of division within the new regulator was that 
between the Health and Safety Commission and the Executive. The HSC 
was intended to act as the policymaking body which would give direction to 
the Executive. It was also the primary consultative and corporatist element 
of the system, and a political buffer between HSE and the wider political 
sphere. It provided a forum within which different interest groups, 
particularly the TUC and CBI, could be heard and consulted. In practice, 
this proved a reasonably constructive process, with a tendency towards 
seeking consensus and being led by the guidance of the HSE, but over time, 
this body came to be seen as something of a political liability; “Trades 
Unions' participation in government had been fashionable in 1972, but no 
longer was in 1992”, as one interviewee put it (John Rimington [Director-
General, HSE 1983-1995] interview, para.73). By the late 1990s and early 
2000s the HSC was attracting rather than deflecting pressure. Overall, it 
might be suggested that the new, unified HSE may be more equipped to act 
in a manner consistent with contemporary government norms of executive 
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agency and managerialism, but less well equipped to liaise with external 
political constituencies.  
 
Regulators and government accountability 
 
HSE sits in a reasonably unusual place, constitutionally, within government; 
as a non-Departmental agency, it has a high degree of functional autonomy, 
something that was intended to help remove its day-to-day operations from 
the wider ‘high’ politics of industrial relations and economic policy (Moran 
2003). At the same time, however, HSE remains answerable to central 
government via its sponsoring department, and thus accountable via 
budgetary controls as well as broader political priority-setting and pressure 
to address specific issues in particular ways. Interviewees, and archival 
materials, point to the influence that different Government preferences and 
ideology can have at particular times; that changes of government do filter 
down into differing approaches and demands on regulators, making it 
inherently political in its operations at times. One example issue highlighted 
has been the role of HSE as a regulator of areas where government, in one 
form or another, also holds the relevant duty (for example, in publicly-
owned industries, or in regimes where approval has to be given for certain 
work practices). Offshore provides one good example of this, as does the 




At both ends of the line, the central concern here has been one of distortion 
over who is accountable, for what, and in what way? These issues are of 
primary importance for those who are involved in decisions about 
resourcing and supporting formal agencies, but also influence wider social 
attitudes (when, for instance, decisions are attributed to regulators that they 
had no hand in; Almond 2015). Central government has, over time, found 
that its capacity to exert centralised, politically-directed control over the 
workings of the regulator has conflicted with the reduced capacity to do this 
that exists within an arms-length arrangement (Baldwin 1995; Black 2008; 
Moran 2003). This may be linked to the emergence of a more critical, 
public-facing, and adversarial tendency around central executive attitudes 
towards health and safety and HSE, as well as to the rounds of Government 
review that HSE has faced at different times (the mid-1980s; the early-
1990s; and between 2010-14). At the same time, the regulator is held 
accountable (formally or informally) for the actions of others – self-
regulating duty-holders, safety professionals, and other public bodies. So the 
problem is almost one of too much, rather than not enough, accountability; 
as perceived and actual responsibility outstrips the capacity to exercise 
control, the perceived legitimacy of health and safety suffers.  
 




The major change in the legal framework of the UK health and safety 
system was the HSWA 1974’s movement from a largely prescriptive system 
of rules and specific duties to a more principles-based, goal-setting regime 
(Baldwin 1995; Robens 1972). This difference is generally regarded as one 
of moving from a system that told duty-holders what to do and how, to one 
that specified the outcome to be pursued (ensuring the health, safety and 
welfare of employees and others) but left the determination of how to fulfil 
this to duty-holders to decide (with due reference to industry standards and 
best practice, Approved Codes of Practice, and other forms of guidance). In 
1977, for example, British Rail noted that the HSWA had ‘already excited 
the imaginations of both managers and staff into a new awareness of the 
general safety problem. Since the employees themselves will be able to take 
the initiative ... it would be reasonable to expect a fresh new commitment by 
the staff to a major reduction in the accident rate of the industry’ (British 
Rail, ‘Fatal Accidents’ memo, 1977: 10). Although sometimes contested 
(notably by trades unions), it is suggested that this model of flexible 
empowerment, rather than prescription, has had significant legitimatory 
effects re: the constitutional bases of regulation.37 Perhaps recognising this, 
an early stated aim of the HSC was to ‘develop programmes stretching 
much wider than the regulatory framework, programmes designed to 
convince everybody at work of their personal responsibility towards health 
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and safety which goes far beyond a formal compliance with the law’ (HSC 
Health and Safety Bulletin, 1977: 1). Many interviewees discussed this shift, 
and linked it to two broader trends: the emergence of new areas of risk to 
govern, and the emergence of the safety profession. The primary legitimacy 
risk identified was that open-ended duties inherently encourage variation in 
practices, and some of this variation will inevitably tend towards the 
excessive; self-regulation places the decision-making burden onto third 
parties, and this allows for risk-averse decisions to be made within the scope 
of the health and safety regime (as undesirable as they may be). John 
Armitt, Chairman of National Express, and formerly Chairman of Railtrack 
and the Olympic Delivery Authority, commented: 
“When this country moved from a regulatory regime such as still 
exists in countries like Germany to the risk assessment regime, to the 
ALARP regime, many people didn’t like it because it required them 
to think. No longer could you say, ‘oh, I’m doing it in accordance 
with the regulation or I’m doing it in accordance with the standard’, 
you actually had to think about the specific task in hand and what 
were the risks and how did you lower those risks” (John Armitt 
interview, para. 9). 
 
Additionally, the open-endedness of the law has been linked to increases in 
the volume of guidance and secondary material generated and available to 
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duty-holders, and to an increase in the complexity and scope of the 
regulatory system (Baldwin 1995). A 1982 review of health and safety in 
the railway industry recorded that ‘The proliferation of instructions on 
safety is a matter of concern to some managers who quote instances where 
it is sometimes necessary to consult several separate documents in order to 
find out how a job should be done’ (British Rail, Outline Report, 1982: 17). 
Interviewees recognised that a principles-based system necessarily leads to 
some loss of clarity, and suggested that this had impacted negatively upon 
the capacity and willingness of some duty-holders to (being ‘forced to think’ 
as a double-edged sword), as well as making the idea of health and safety 
subject to greater expert oversight, proceduralisation, and bureaucracy. In 
particular, many felt that this encouraged duty-holders to replicate the rules-
based, prescriptiveness of the pre-1974 regime within their own 
organisations, leading to risk aversion and poor decision-making. One 
facetious response in the agricultural sector protested ‘I really do not know 
where to begin and end on this one. How far do we go? “Staff should not 
walk under ladders” or “Staff should take every care that they do not put 
their foot in a rabbit hole”!’ (Land Settlement Association Memo, 1976). 
The focus group data suggests that this problem was seen and encountered 
widely in workplaces and everyday life – inflexible and overbearing written 
policies, rigid and formal internal HR/H+S officers, and a sense of pervasive 
managerialism characterised many accounts, and crucially, this was often 
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located at local, not regulatory, levels. According to Kevin Myers, Deputy 
Chief Executive of the HSE 
“my thesis is the prescriptive legislative regime that we’ve tried to 
do away with by the HSWA…is now being replaced, within parts of 
our society by, in the name of self-regulation, people writing their 
own proscriptive lists of what you can and can’t and shouldn’t, 
wouldn’t, couldn’t do.” (Kevin Myers interview, para. 48). 
 
Europe and ‘regulation from outside’ 
 
Europe, and the influence of Europe, has been one of the primary sources of 
concern for policymakers and politicians with regard to the legitimacy of 
health and safety regulations (Baldwin 1995). Since the Single European 
Act 1987 s.118A, which set out Community aims and interests in standard-
setting in the workplace, the EU has increasingly been seen by politicians, 
policymakers, and the media as a source of legislative interventions (most 
notoriously the 6-Pack regulations of 1992) and of a non-accountable 
bureaucratic over-reaching, and precautionary unreasonableness, which has 
fundamentally damaged the legitimacy of health and safety as a whole. 
Europe is often thought to be much more risk-averse than UK and US 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ jurisdictions, and to favour precaution and prescription over 
more ‘proportionalized’ and risk-based modes of regulation (Löfstedt 2011; 
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Rothstein et al. 2015; Vogel 2012) and so Europe has been identified and 
targeted as a bastion of over-regulation, excessiveness, and 
unreasonableness in approach and outcome. So, one factor for deciding 
what should be included in the HSC’s work programme for 1981-82 was the 
need ‘to respond to, and where appropriate, seek to change European 
Community or other international initiatives, and to stimulate such 
initiatives where this will help to ensure that realistic and effective health 
and safety policies can be adopted in this country’ (HSC Press Release, 
1981). 
 
On the other hand, empirical data suggests that the public remain pretty 
uninformed and unconcerned about the EU’s role in this area, and the focus 
groups confirmed that there was very little connection made between health 
and safety and the EU. While there may be a wider anti-EU agenda in play 
in UK politics, this does not necessarily seem to implicate health and safety 
directly, rather the often similar-looking antipathy to this area of regulation 
probably stems from a similar political or ideological source. It is worth 
reflecting on the extent and depth of the toxic political legacy that 
association with Europe via the 6-Pack and other legislation has had for 
health and safety; the 1980s and 1990s, and a lurch towards Euroscepticism 
on the right of politics in particular during this time, ‘poisoned the well’ for 
domestic regulators, and has indirectly created significant legitimacy 
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challenges around issues of mandate and accountability. John Rimington, 
Director General of the HSE 1983-95, remembered that: 
“By 1986 'Europe' was producing regulations which HSE (under 
supervision from the Department of Employment and the Foreign 
Office) had to negotiate. Early European regulations had all been 
based on British models and this had been largely uncontroversial. 
However, as time went on, several strands of political phobia 
became engaged and entangled in the process. These were (1) 
dislike of 'European' interference in 'British' law; (2) the idea of the 
'nanny state'; (3) the traditional Tory dislike of 'burdens on business' 
and susceptibility to the views of small companies. There was also 
(4) a more sophisticated objection to the idea of 'principled' as 
opposed to 'mandatory' legislation in the Anglo-Saxon tradition.” 
(John Rimington interview, para. 66). 
 
At the same time, analysis of the relevant legislation, of the information and 
experiences of policymaking in Europe, and the outcome of various disputes 
tends to suggest, the UK actually has much more agency in terms of EU-
level law-making than many accounts suggest, and has not necessarily been 
dragged in directions it did not want to go to the degree that some might 
suggest (Rothstein et al. 2015). On this reading, then, it might be suggested 
that the EU is a political factor shaping the legitimacy of health and safety, 
24 
 
and an institutional factor, but has not been quite as relevant at a social or 
normative level. 
 
B: Health and Safety in a Changing World 
 
What are the main contextual changes that have reshaped the world in 
which health and safety arises as an area of risk, and is regulated? What 
effects have they had in terms of perceptions of legitimacy and the 
functional and democratic bases of ‘health and safety’ in the UK? 
 
The decline of traditional industry 
 
It is well documented that the period 1960-2015 has seen a major 
realignment of the British economy and workplace; traditional, manual, 
heavily unionised industries (manufacturing, heavy production, 
extraction/mining) have declined in terms of their scale and in the share of 
the workforce employed, and this has led to a number of effects, not least 
the reduction in the influence and power of traditional trade unions. One 
additional result has been a reduction in the perceived legitimacy of health 
and safety provision, as industries where there are clear and established 
risks, and long traditions of risk regulation, serve to reinforce the idea of 
regulation as socially valuable. This perception was widely reflected in the 
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focus groups. Additionally, one of the strengths and enduring legacies of 
these traditional industries had always been that they acted as ‘leaders’ for 
the health and safety agenda, developing and disseminating new modes of 
risk management and expertise. Traditional heavy industries could represent 
themselves as carriers of a substantial body of expertise and influence, and 
thus engage with policymakers as partners within the broadly cooperative 
health and safety regime. In the absence of these ‘leader industries’, it may 
be harder in the future for those working in health and safety to establish the 
value of what they do. Jim Hammer reflected that 
“The other reason why people are not so aware of the real 
importance of health and safety nowadays is that the big industries 
that used to cause the dramatic, serious accidents, the ship building, 
chemical works, and big steelworks, talking in general terms, don’t 
exist anymore. Yes, I know I’m exaggerating, but people don’t have 
this perception that it’s important to defend, to look after working 
people because so many of them are just drivers and subject to the 
usual hazards of road traffic accidents.” (Jim Hammer interview, 
para. 67). 
As well as the shift away from key leader industries in safety policy, this 
change in the makeup of the British economy and workplace profile has also 
seen the emergence of new industries and sectors, which have their own 
challenges and political contexts. Certain of these (major retail, 
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supermarkets, SMEs) are, it is suggested, now leaders in influencing the 
agenda of government. These workplaces also feature different challenging 
elements (subcontractors and supply chains, temporary and short-term 
contracts, mobile workforces). Crucially, it remains to be seen how 
traditional notions of ‘health and safety’ map across into these sectors, in 
terms of making the normative case for intervention, and showing that the 
delivery of effective health and safety provision is efficient, proportionate, 
and of value. 
 
The decline of Trade Unionism/Worker Representation 
 
One key feature of the changing industrial context of modern Britain has 
been the decline of trade union membership (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999; 
Visser 2012). This decline has been reflected elsewhere in the absence of 
organised labour as a leading influence from policymaking and political 
processes. There have been wider social and cultural shifts in how labour 
protection is viewed, how policy is made, and how representation and 
worker engagement is undertaken. How far does a key role for unions 
remain in a post-industrial world (James and Walters 2002; Quinlan 1999; 
Walters 2006)? How does a decline in unionism affect the democratic 
legitimacy claims that are made on behalf of the idea of health and safety? It 
appears, at least from the initial indications, that unions retain the greatest 
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influence in industries where health and safety is either a less immediately 
relevant factor (the public sector) or subject to specific risks and regulatory 
regimes (construction, extraction), hence engagement is bounded to these 
spheres rather than generalised. 
 
Unionism has also been heavily politicised and contested during this period, 
bringing issues of ‘high’ politics into the workplace. Trade unions have, 
according to the data gathered, seen a reduction in their ability to influence 
outcomes and a marginalisation in policymaking spheres, from key partners 
within sometimes uneasy formal processes, to vocal, but external, critics. 
Health and safety has featured as a component of these wider industrial 
relations disputes, but perhaps not to the extent or degree that other issues 
(wages, conditions) have during the same time period. One explanation for 
this is that health and safety has remained a ‘day-to-day’ feature of business, 
via representative and consultative measures, and so a ‘safe haven’ in which 
trade unionism could remain relevant, active and fresh, even in times of 
conflict elsewhere. This was articulated by the General Secretary of the 
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers in 1972, claiming the trade 
unions made an ‘extensive contribution’ to accident prevention 
(Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers Journal, 1972: 395). It was 
also the case, according to interviewees, that trade union involvement in 
safety was useful; as people who knew the area and issues, union reps 
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carried a lot of expertise (often more than employers themselves). As Tim 
Carter, a former HSE official, recalled: 
“it was not acknowledged, and what you see as soon as you’re in 
HSE, actually on casework and working conditions, most union reps 
and shop stewards do their best to do a good job” (Tim Carter 
interview, para.105). 
 
As trade unionism has declined, therefore, a lot of the impetus behind the 
promotion of health and safety as an issue has arguably been lost. According 
to Chris Marchese, Chief Operations Officer for Magnox Nuclear Ltd in the 
2000s: 
“in the last ten years there’s been a gradual loss in influence, to the 
detriment of the management side I feel, from the loss of 
empowerment by trade unions. In the industry fewer people belong 
to trades unions...Because there are fewer trade union members 
their organisations are much smaller, so they are not in a position to 
support their own trades union representatives as much as they used 
to. We can make up for some of that, but because they’re not pushing 
safety representatives enough...we struggle to get volunteers...” 
(Chris Marchese interview, para.53). 
 




There have been new and emergent disputes about the proper limits of 
‘health and safety’ as a concept, and about the ways in which it should be 
implemented and addressed. Some of these extend beyond the formal 
regulatory system and demand attention in a study of the social phenomena 
of ‘health and safety’. 
 
Health and safety beyond the workplace 
Perhaps the principal finding and area of interest re: the changing profile of 
health and safety has been the perceived influence and importance of the 
extension of regulation applied to occupational health and safety issues that 
have an impact beyond the workplace. This was massively extended by the 
HSWA 1974 s.3 (a new duty prompted in part by the experience of 
Flixborough and other disasters), but also arguably aided by the Offices, 
Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963’s extension of the law to ‘new 
entrants’ and industries. In general terms, there is a recognition that, as the 
1970s turned into the 1980s, more attention began to be paid to issues of 
health and safety in the wider world. A TGWU rep claimed that what was 
needed was ‘a government-sponsored campaign...to sell safety to the whole 
community’ (Industrial Safety, 1972: 410). Wider attention was paid to 
issues including asbestos, domestic gas supply (1985), violence at work, 
leisure facilities and public spaces (late 1980s), as well as major disasters 
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that either affected the public (rail crashes like Clapham, 1988) or went 
beyond the ‘factory fence’ (prompted as well by the Seveso directives). 
From approximately the mid-80s onwards, a new focus on public safety is 
identified and reported, reflected in things like the development of HSE’s 
Tolerability of Risk framework (HSE 1988), a new methodological interest 
in public attitudes, and a new politicisation of issues of public protection. 
Roger Bibbings, health and safety advisor at the TUC from 1977-1994, 
recalled that the Director-General of the HSE: 
“invited me to come and present from a TUC perspective to get the 
discussion going amongst his senior colleagues. So I said, ‘oh you 
need to look again at worker safety and so on’…not very long into 
this, he put his hand up and said, ‘no, no, no, stop my boy, 
stop…that’s worker safety. That’s a dead volcano’, he said. ‘The live 
volcano is public safety. That is what’s going to energise everyone’” 
(Roger Bibbings interview, para. 19). 
 
Many interviewees expressed concern about the seemingly unbounded 
nature of these areas and duties, which went beyond what Robens/the 
HSWA had envisaged, and about the implications for practice (resources, 
the inapplicability of workplace-oriented standards and levels of expected 
compliance, the demands re: risk management being rolled out to 
unqualified people) and perception (that this was a key source of public 
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frustration and perceptions of over-regulation). In particular, interviewees 
suggested that neither HSE nor HSC were equipped or ready to take these 
roles on, leading to areas of neglect, confusion, or resistance. The focus 
group data clearly highlighted this issue of overspill as a major concern that 
had fundamentally undermined perceptions of legitimacy and value – in 
workplaces, and ‘genuine’ risk settings, health and safety was seen as 
legitimate and valuable, but this did not extend to all areas of public and 
private life, and contributed significantly to perceptions of over-regulation. 
It was also noticeable that there were perceptions that certain sectors and 
workplaces were felt to fall outside the scope of ‘legitimate’ health and 
safety intervention by the public, by regulators, and by other interviewees. 
 
The emergence of the safety profession 
 
Another one of the main issues to have emerged is the development of the 
safety profession as a component of the contemporary health and safety 
landscape. While Robens and the 1974 Act envisaged a three-legged stool 
(state regulators, trades unions, employers), the safety profession occupies a 
conceptual space somewhere between these three constituencies; managing 
risks for and within employer firms, holding a normative commitment to 
worker well-being and a similarity of interest with trade unions, and 
occupying a quasi-regulatory role as standard-setters and compliance-
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monitors within a polycentric self-regulatory regime. What influence and 
impact have the new safety professions, which were starting to emerge in 
the first half of the 20th century but which have gained traction and 
momentum since 1974, had upon the perceived legitimacy of the issue? 
Janet Asherson, Head of Health and Safety at the Confederation of British 
Industry 1989-2008, believed that 
“Frankly, it’s a consultant’s paradise because it’s got such low 
barriers to entry…there’s nothing in it for a consultant to say there 
is no risk there. It’s a very brave consultant who would ever say 
you’re managing that OK. You can always find something that has 
to be done...it’s frustrating to professionals but has also allowed the 
professional bubble to burst into society and be viewed by society 
and particularly the media to see those elements of taking things too 
far, making things too bureaucratic” (Janet Asherson interview, 
para. 52). 
 
One short answer is that they have been perceived as a central component in 
the bureaucratisation and growth/pervasiveness of health and safety and 
risk-aversion, at least in the eyes of key witnesses (particularly regulators) 
and the public. They are seen as unregulated, often unskilled, and 
sometimes a barrier to good practice. Testimony to the Robens Committee 
recognised that safety professionals had ‘to earn people’s respect before 
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they will expect much from us’ but at the same time groups like RoSPA had, 
over the preceding few years ‘introduced professionalism into the work 
[and] people are listening to us’ (RoSPA, verbal evidence, 1971: 5). The 
positive impact in raising overall standards, and in filling the gaps left 
behind as union engagement and membership recedes, was also 
acknowledged; the training, professionalization, and systematisation of the 
professional has been recognised as a key factor in improving overall rates 
of injury etc. But this remains a limited acknowledgement. Public attitudes 
tend to regard the ‘safety guys’ as boring, jobsworths, people who meddle 
and make life harder (Pidgeon et al. 2003) – as early as 1971 RoSPA 
observed that there was a public image problem around health and safety, an 
issue seen as ‘stuffy’ (RoSPA National Publicity Committee minutes, 1971: 
5). But it is worth noting how embedded the safety profession was in our 
interview sample; almost all now in the field of the ‘safety professional’ or 
representative body had experience or background in either regulatory or 
trade union settings, or had come to it via those routes; many in business or 
in regulatory settings had safety profession memberships, and many were 
also very aware of one another’s roles and interests – there is a high degree 
of interdependence, overlap, and cooperation with these other 
constituencies. 
 




One key factor that seems to be vital in determining the perceived functional 
legitimacy of health and safety as an idea is the relationship between risk 
and expertise. Health and safety intervention is respected and seen as 
necessary or desirable when it is linked to a strong basis in expertise; focus 
groups and other public attitude sources point to the centrality of expertise 
(measured, demonstrated, certified, and experiential) to the assessment of 
the legitimacy of regulators and safety actors (Black 2008; Pidgeon et al. 
2003; Tyler 2011). The single most influential cited factor shaping whether 
members of the public would listen to, respect, and cooperate with, a ‘safety 
professional’ or advisor, was the perceived level of experience and expertise 
of that individual. An offshore inspector noted of the 1980s and 1990s that 
working relationships were good because offshore workers and managers 
“knew exactly what our job was, they knew that we were professional 
people…with engineering backgrounds, we understood what they were 
trying to do” (Martin Thompson interview, tape 2 side b). Expertise has an 
enduring, robust, and pervasive importance to issues of legitimacy; it 
establishes credentials for intervening and for reordering the world.  
 
There is a more negative associated effect of this expertise; that it leads to 
bureaucratisation and unnecessary paperwork. In the early 1980s an 
investigation into British Rail’s implementation of the HSWA noted that 
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some managers ‘are dismissive about the [local OHS] statements regarding 
them as a paperwork exercise which add little to BR’s existing safety effort’ 
(British Rail, Outline Report, 1982: 1). There is also a concern that expertise 
creates systematic, instrumentalised approaches to safety based in technical 
and impenetrable mind-sets that are hard for lay people to understand, and 
which create a distance between ‘health and safety’ and regular people. A 
1977 British Rail memo noted enthusiasm for health and safety generated by 
the HSWA, but followed it with a warning: ‘It would be a tragedy if, 
instead, implementation of the Act became a battlefield of disagreement 
on...unreasonable safety standards’ (British Rail, ‘Fatal Accidents’ memo, 
1977: 10). This way of seeing, in actuarial terms, is also identified at a 
regulatory level; the trends towards targets, probabilities, quantification, and 
proceduralism (Black 2008), while necessary from the point of view of 
efficiency and effectiveness, also have costs in terms of the ‘jargon’ and 
accessibility of the measures and systems that they establish, and thus on 
degrees of acceptance and cooperation, as recognised by Helen Leiser who 
worked at senior levels in both the HSE and Department of Trade and 
Industry: 
“one of the dilemmas for the health and safety organisations and the 
HSE now is actually it’s a little bit beyond the frame of people’s day 
to day preoccupations. People have strong views about the 
regulations on cycles using main roads or cycle tracks and so on 
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because you see that every day...but whether people would really 
have a considered view about the relevance of particular legislation, 
I’m not sure” (Helen Leiser interview, para. 110). 
 
D: Justice Challenges: Whose Values Underpin Regulation? 
 
The last area to explore is the idea of justice-based legitimacy; how far is 
protecting worker safety and health, and the welfare of others, seen as the 




One tension in decisions about what is desirable and justifiable in this area, 
is the impact of a trend towards commercialisation upon perceptions of 
health and safety as an issue. On the one hand, the public perception, 
gathered via the focus groups, was that the linking of safety issues to the 
pursuit of profit was toxic, in terms of perceptions. The more it was seen as 
a ‘job creation exercise’, as self-serving, and as a service that was paid for 
rather than undertaken for genuine moral reasons, the greater attitudes 
towards health and safety hardened and became more hostile. It turns out the 
only thing more disliked than a health and safety jobsworth is a health and 
safety jobsworth who is in it to make money. This concern about 
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commercialisation was mirrored elsewhere, with others such as Roger 
Bibbings suggesting that issues like FFI and other approaches would 
undermine the credentials and effectiveness of the regulator: 
“HSE has become a service delivery organisation, its mission has 
changed…HSE is being turned into a delivery agency with a 
significant element of self-funding…what is lost in that potentially is 
the ability of the civil servants who run it to basically think about 
improvement and think about how things can be done differently and 
better. And I think there’s a great danger at the moment that HSE 
will not be able to, if it is purely a delivery agency, to exercise the 
level of creativity required to take health and safety forward” 
(Roger Bibbings interview, para. 35). 
 
For the most part, stakeholders tended to indicate that they saw 
commercialisation as a legitimate means of extending the reach of the 
regulatory system, and thus as a good thing. But this balance is difficult, 
because doing so does change the terms and conditions on which health and 
safety engagement occurs. Public attitudes to tend to suggest that the moral 
stance of those in the field is one of the key strengths that those bodies and 
agencies have; this is lost when there is a sense of undue commercialisation. 
The other aspect of commercialisation is the notion that it renders health and 
safety a service to be paid for, rather than a process to invest in – that 
38 
 
companies outsource it, and pay lip service as a result. According to one 
offshore inspector, within the HSE “there was unease…because we felt 
that…if a company has to pay for coming along and having a meeting with 
us to talk about something where they’re going to be proactive in terms of 
health and safety that that might actually discourage these sort of meetings, 
you know, and…the full interchange of information” (Martin Thompson 
interview, tape 4 side a). There is a need for this relationship to be reviewed 
and for ways of resetting or pitching the role of the external advisor or 
expert in a way that avoids this toxic association. 
 
The Limits of Consensus? 
 
There is ample evidence of a breakdown of political consensus around the 
issue of health and safety, at least at the level of party politics, ideology, and 
media coverage. Many interviewees testified to the contested nature of 
policy in these areas, and the changing political fortunes of ‘health and 
safety’ at different times. As well as the ideological and policy preferences 
of Ministers and governments there is a perception of a broader political 
shift towards the language and terminology of a neoliberal settlement 
(Almond 2015; Harvey 2005; James, Tombs, and Whyte 2013; Tombs and 
Whyte 2010), something that goes beyond immediate policy issues, and 
beyond health and safety itself, to encompass a new way of seeing the 
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world. Different governments approach this differently, but the climate has 
hardened, not just with regards to accountability and reviews (Hood 1991), 
but to a broader rejection of a welfare-oriented outlook, as noted by 
Lawrence Waterman, Director of Health and Safety for the Battersea Power 
Station development and formerly Head of Health and Safety for the 
Olympic Delivery Authority: 
“it [health and safety] never really got on the Conservative Party 
agenda, and ever since they’ve been…‘God, we really didn’t mean 
to join Europe and we’d like to leave’. ‘We didn’t really mean to 
support the Health and Safety at Work Act and we’d like to move 
backwards.’ So why not express it in those terms? Because that 
would make them sound as though they’re callously indifferent to 
injuries to workers, which they probably, in the main, are” 
(Lawrence Waterman interview, para.10). 
 
That said, public attitudes do remind us of the need to separate these 
political currents and trends from the general attitudes and preferences of 
the public; there remains a deep-rooted acceptance of the idea of health and 
safety, and recognition of the right to safety. These preferences are 
embedded beneath a layer of negative public opinions, which obscure them, 
but consideration of the issues does reveal these more considered positions 
and views. This is also, to some degree, true also of the political sphere – 
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health and safety is not really ever rejected outright as an important area, 
except by the most extreme sceptics. Health and safety does retain a 
grounding of popular and political acceptance and support. The project is 
not as badly perceived as might be thought. There remain areas where 
conflicts arise, and these do tend to cluster around pinch points where the 
needs of the job, and the tension between safety and profit, collide. While 
this has long been the case, there is evidence that these tensions do remain. 
On the other hand, this opens doors for improvement where the business 
case for safety can be demonstrated. 
 
4) The policy implications of these developments 
 
So what are the implications of this account of change over time for the 
future of OHS practice and regulation? A number of suggestions for a 
restructuring of public engagement around the issue of OHS can be made: 
 
i. Public perceptions of health and safety have two tiers; opinions 
(immediate, critical, transient), and attitudes (considered, positive, 
enduring). When people stop to think about what health and safety 
means, their attitudes are much less critical. It is important for those 
engaged in ‘selling’ health and safety to separate ‘signal’ from 
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‘noise’; this might also caution against over-engagement with 
‘regulatory myths’ (Almond 2009). 
 
ii. Despite changes to the world of work, there are still audiences and 
demands for health and safety in offices and service-sector 
industries, which need to be approached in new, context-specific 
ways. Resistance generally concerns the ‘low politics’ of local 
issues, while the ‘high politics’ of the ideal remains relevant. Those 
working in health and safety should not avoid making moral 
arguments about its value. 
 
iii. Expertise remains a fundamentally important feature of ‘good’ 
regulation and health and safety. Developments here (like the 
exporting of expertise from the UK to other jurisdictions) are 
potential tools with which to leverage legitimacy. Universities 
provide an example of ‘selling’ the value of contributions to the 
global knowledge economy within domestic political debate. 
 
iv. Where there are issues of legal and structural form (the EU, or the 
open-ended duties in HSWA 1974), there has perhaps been a 
tendency to play these issues down or distance ‘health and safety’ 
from implication. It may be time to consider presenting these steps 
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more directly as success stories, rather than as potentially toxic 
heritage: ‘health and safety: where the UK got its own way in 
Europe’. 
 
v. As traditional ‘leader industries’ decline, there is a need for new 
leaders to emerge as contexts where i) the benefits of regulation can 
be made explicit, and ii) new modes of working and risk 
management can be developed and disseminated. The construction 
and agriculture industries have the potential to perform this role, not 
because of their spotless records, but because they can demonstrably 
reinforce the fact that health and safety matters. 
 
vi. Commercialisation of health and safety needs careful management; it 
erodes the most fundamental pillar of public legitimation that the 
idea of health and safety possesses – the sense that it is for the public 
good and undertaken for the public good and with humanitarian 
motives in mind. The safety profession, and regulators, need to fight 




Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers Journal, September 1972. 
43 
 
British Rail, ‘An Outline Report on OSH’, 1982. The National Archives of 
the UK [TNA], London, AN 16/157. 
British Rail, ‘Fatal Accidents to B.R.B. Employees’, Memo to British Rail 
Board, 16 August 1977. TNA, AN 156/936. 
HSC Health & Safety Bulletin, 4 October 1977. Museum of English Rural 
Life [MERL], Reading, CR3LSA AD9/1/222. 
HSC press release, 18 June 1981; Mitchell Library, Glasgow, TD914/18/2. 
HSE Management Board Minutes, 19 June 1975, Min. 2,a,i. TNA, EF 10/1. 
Industrial Safety, September 1972. 
Land Settlement Association memo, 20 May 1976. MERL, CR3 LSA 
AD9/1/222. 
Martin Thompson, interview for University of Aberdeen ‘Lives in the Oil 
Industry’ project, British Library, London, C963/13. 
RoSPA National Publicity Committee minutes, 22 September 1971.  RoSPA 
archives, Birmingham, D.266/2/4/3. 




Almond P. The Dangers of Hanging Baskets: Regulatory Myths' and Media 
Representations of Health and Safety Regulation. Journal of Law 
and Society. 2009; 36/3: 352-375. 
44 
 
Almond P. Revolution Blues: The Reconstruction of Health and Safety Law 
as ‘Common-Sense’ Regulation. Journal of Law and Society. 2015; 
42/2: 202-229. 
Almond, P and Esbester M. (Il)legitimate risks? Perceptions of occupational 
safety and health in post-1960 Britain, in T. Crook and M. Esbester 
(eds.), Governing Risks. Danger, Safety and Accidents in Modern 
Britain, c.1800-2000. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016; 295-
314. 
Baldwin R. Rules and Government. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1995. 
Baldwin R. and Cave M. Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and 
Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1999. 
Balleisen EJ. and Brake EK. Historical Perspective and Better Regulatory 
Governance: An Agenda for Institutional Reform. Regulation & 
Governance.2014; 8/2: 222-245. 
Bartrip P, and Fenn PT. The Evolution of Regulatory Style in the 
Nineteenth Century British Factory Inspectorate. Journal of Law and 
Society. 1983; 10/2: 201-222. 
Beetham D. The Legitimacy of Power London: Macmillan; 1991. 
Berridge V. Thinking in time: does health policy need history as evidence? 
Lancet. 2010; 375/9717: 798-799. 
Black J. The Emergence of Risk-based Regulation and the new Public Risk 
Management in the United Kingdom. Public Law. 2005; 512-549. 
45 
 
Black J. Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in 
Polycentric Regulatory Regimes. Regulation & Governance 2008; 
2/2: 137-164. 
Business Taskforce. Cut EU Red Tape: Report from the Business Taskforce, 
London: HM Government; 2013. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment
_data/file/249969/TaskForce-report-15-October.pdf  
Carson WG. The Conventionalisation of Early Factory Crime. International 
Journal of the Sociology of Law. 1979; 7/1: 37-60. 
Cox P. The Future Uses of History. History Workshop Journal. 2013; 71/1: 
125-145. 
Ebbinghaus B. and Visser J. When Institutions Matter: Union Growth and 
Decline in Western Europe, 1950–1995. European Sociological 
Review. 1999; 15/2: 135-158. 
Esbester M. The Birth of Modern Safety. Preventing Worker Accidents on 
Britain’s Railways, 1871-1948. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis; 
forthcoming. 
Harvey D. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; 2005. 




Hood C. A Public Management for All Seasons? Public Administration. 
1991; 69/1: 3-19. 
HSE. The Tolerability of Risks from Nuclear Power Stations. London: HSE 
Books. 1988. 
Jain, A. and Leka, S. Occupational Health and Safety Legitimacy in the UK: 
A Review of Quantitative Data. University of Nottingham: 
Nottingham; 2015. 
James P, Tombs S and Whyte D. (2013) An Independent Review of British 
Health and Safety Regulation? From Common Sense to Non-sense. 
Policy Studies. 2013; 34/1: 36-52. 
James, P and Walters, D. Worker Representation in Health and Safety: 
Options for Regulatory Reform. Industrial Relations Journal. 2002. 
33/2: 141-156. 
Löfstedt R. Reclaiming Health and Safety for All: An Independent Review of 
Health and Safety Legislation [The Löfstedt Review]. London: 
Crown; 2011. 
Long V. The Rise and Fall of the Healthy Factory: The Politics of Industrial 
Health in Britain, 1914-60. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan’ 2011. 
MacDonagh O. The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A 
Reappraisal. Historical Journal. 1958; 1/1: 52-67. 
McIvor A. Working Lives:  Work in Britain Since 1945. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan; 2013. 
47 
 
Mess HA. Factory Legislation and its Administration 1891-1924. London: 
P. S. King & Son; 1926. 
Mills C. Regulating Health and Safety in the British Mining Industry, 1800-
1914. Aldershot: Ashgate; 2010. 
Moran, M. The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper 
Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2003. 
Murphy K, Tyler T and Curtis A. Nurturing Regulatory Compliance: Is 
Procedural Justice Effective When People Question the Legitimacy 
of the Law? Regulation & Governance. 2009; 3/1: 1-26. 
Pidgeon, N. Walls, J. Weyman, A. and Horlick-Jones, T. Perceptions of and 
Trust in the Health and Safety Executive as a Risk Regulator 
[Research Report 100]. Sudbury: HSE Books. 2003. 
Quinlan, M. The Implications of Labour Market Restructuring in 
Industrialized Societies for Occupational Health and Safety. 
Economic and Industrial Democracy. 1999; 20/3: 427-460. 
Lord Robens. Safety and Health at Work: Report of the Committee 1970-72 
(The Robens Report). London: HMSO; 1972. 
Rothstein, H. Beaussier, AL, Borraz, O, Bouder, F, Demeritt, D, de Haan, 
M, Huber, M, Paul, R, and Wesseling M. When ‘Must’ Means 
‘Maybe’: Varieties of Risk Regulation and the Problem of Trade-offs 
in Europe. HowSAFE Working Paper No.1. 2015. 
48 
 
Suchman M. Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. 
The Academy of Management Review.1995; 20/3: 571-610. 
Temple M. Triennial Review Report: Health and Safety Executive [The 
Temple Review]. London: HMSO; 2014. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/triennial-review-
report-health-and-safety-executive-2014  
Thomas MW. The Early Factory Legislation: A Study in Legislative and 
Administrative Evolution. Leigh-on-Sea: Thames Bank; 1948. 
Tombs S. and Whyte D. A Deadly Consensus: Worker Safety and 
Regulatory Degradation under New Labour. British Journal of 
Criminology. 2010; 50/1: 46-65. 
Tucker E. And Defeat Goes On: An Assessment of Third-Wave Health and 
Safety Regulation, in: F Pearce and L Snider (eds.) Corporate 
Crime: Contemporary Debates. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press; 1995, p.245-267. 
Tyler TR. The Psychology of Self-Regulation: Normative Motivations for 
Compliance, in C. Parker and V.L. Nielsen (eds.) Explaining 
Compliance: Business Responses to Regulation Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar; 2011: p78-102. 
Visser, J. The Rise and Fall of Industrial Unionism. Transfer: European 
Review of Labour and Research. 2012; 18/1: 129-141. 
49 
 
Vogel, D. The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety, and 
Environmental Risks in Europe and the United States. Princeton 
University Press; 2012. 
Walters, D. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Worker Representation 
and Health and Safety in the United Kingdom. International Journal 
of Health Services. 2006; 36/1: 87-111. 
Ward JT. The Factory Movement 1830-1855 London: Macmillan; 1962. 
Young D. Common Sense, Common Safety [The Young Review]. London: 
Crown; 2010. 
